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<C-AB>Abstract: Typically, human decision making is emotionally “hot” and does not 
conform to “cold” classical probability (CP) theory. As quantum probability (QP) theory 
emphasises order, context, superimposition states, and nonlinear dynamic effects, one of 
its major strengths may be its power to unify formal modeling and realistic psychological 
theory (e.g., information uncertainty, anxiety, and indecision, as seen in the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma). 
<C-Text begins> 
Classical probability (CP) theory has struggled to provide a comprehensive, sometimes 
even adequate, description and explanation of human decision making.  This conclusion 
has pervaded psychology and related disciplines, for example in economics, where the 
notion of a rational single-type homo economicus is fast falling out of favour and being 
replaced by one that highlights the heterogeneity of economic agents and their decision- 
making processes. Many behavioural scientists doubt that formal modeling based on CP 
principles can describe and explain even relatively simple laboratory-based behaviour, let 
alone the everyday examples that, typically, entail some degree of emotional activation 
by virtue of the different payoffs associated with different possible outcomes. The fact 
that different outcomes exist is, itself, sufficient to induce conflict-related emotion, thus 
rending typical human decision making “hot.”  
 Whatever the ultimate value of quantum probability (QP) theory, it represents a 
promising way forward to model the computations of cognition involved in complex 
psychological situations. The need for such a formal modeling theory is highlighted by 
the trend in recent years towards an integration of “cold” cognition with “hot” 
(emotional) processes and decision making, as seen in the “cognition-emotion” literature. 
CP theory is poorly equipped to meet this challenge. This commentary explores the 
potential of QP theory to provide a general modeling approach for realistic psychology 
theory. 
 In the typical laboratory situation, the experimenter tries to control all extraneous 
variables to isolate only those of interest; however, in the case of human studies, internal 
states of the participant cannot be controlled. Participants bring to the experimental 
situation their own expectations, desires, and habitual modes of thinking and behaving; 
and, worse still for the experimentalist, these factors differ among individuals. This fact is 
seen readily in experimental games studied by behavioural economists, in which 
understanding of behaviour is impoverished by failing to account for dispositional 
differences in preferences and personality (Ferguson et al. 2011).  
 The abovementioned points can easily be illustrated in relation to the “sure thing” 
principle seen with the prisoner’s dilemma problem. The literature shows: (1) knowing 
that one’s partner has defected leads to a higher probability of defection; (2) knowing that 
one’s partner has cooperated also leads to a higher probability of defection; and, most 
troubling for CP theory, (3) not knowing one’s partner’s decision leads to a higher 
probability of cooperation. Everyday equivalents of this situation do not, typically, 
resemble the decision-making dynamics assumed by CP theory: people have 
psychological processes that it fails to model, or to even consider to be relevant. For 
example, in this situation, outcome (1) could simply be (self-serving) retaliation; and in 
the case of (2) taking the easier route, but, we should wonder, what would happen if the 
partner was a loved one (e.g., your child)? Scenario (3) is a situation of uncertainty and 
psychological conflict (at least as perceived by many participants), and we know from the 
literature that such conflicts lead to cautious, risk-assessing behaviour which should be 
expected to lower rates of defection (which represents a final decision devoid of any 
cognitive dithering). Not knowing one’s partner’s decision is, in psychological if not 
logical terms, very different to outcomes (1) and (2); therefore, we should expect a 
different decision outcome. 
 The main point of the previous discussion is that in a situation of information 
uncertainty, people’s decisions will be influenced by a host of factors, including 
evaluation of likely payoffs as well as consideration of reputational damage and likely 
carry-over effects to other situations. Most decision situations outside the laboratory do 
not resemble the constraints of the one-shot experiment, and in this situation people find 
it difficult to break free from their habitual forms of cognition. In actual fact, most 
laboratory-based decision-making situations are not as tightly constrained as assumed by 
the experimenter; for example, the experimenter typically knows the participant’s 
decision and the participants know that the experimenter knows. This is relevant 
information from the participant’s point of view. In designing experimental situations, it 
is important to make things as simple as possible, but not to the extent that the situation 
loses touch with psychological reality and, therefore, external validity. 
 As an example of the consequences of information uncertainty, which is inherent 
in the prisoner’s dilemma problem, psychological entropy has been used to account for its 
effects. As noted by Hirsh  et al. (2012), “As a system’s disorder and uncertainty 
increases, its ability to perform useful work is hampered by reduced accuracy in 
specifying the current state, the desired state, and the appropriate response for 
transforming the former into the later” (p. 305). They further note that uncertainty leads 
to goal-conflict and anxiety, which adds further emotional heat to the cognitive system. 
And, as with many other processes, in the specific example of conflict-related anxiety, we 
observe a change in the balance between controlled-reflective and automatic-reflexive 
behaviour (Corr 2011) which can, and often does, lead to nonlinear dynamic effects of 
the type predicted by QP theory. In addition, the perception of potential rewards and 
punishments in the situation trigger prepotent automatic reactions (e.g., in the case of 
goal-conflict anxiety, behavioural inhibition and cognitive rumination; McNaughton & 
Corr 2004) which we may well expect to impact on decision-making processes in 
complex, but unpredictable, ways. Therefore, CP modeling of the prisoner’s dilemma 
problem does not tell us much about how people actually behave in “hot” decision- 
making situations.  
 In contrast, one major opportunity of QP theory is the provision of a general 
computational framework for the modeling of dynamic, and realistic, psychological 
processes. As Pothos and Busemeyer observe, QP theory has strong potential in this 
regard because it takes account of processes that are strongly order and context 
dependent, recognises that individual states are often superimposition states, and assumes 
that composite systems are often entangled and cannot be composed into their separate 
subsystems. It would be valuable for Pothos and Busemeyer to consider how their 
proposals for QP theory might be extended to start to address emotionally hot cognition 
and behaviour.  
<C-Text ends> 
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